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«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH
LIVING FOR HUMAN BEINGS»
A POLITICAL INTERPRETATION
OF SOCRATES’ WATCHWORD
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«Has there ever been anyone else,
slave or free man, whose deliverance
from illness had been due to
Socrates?»
Socrates in the Gorgias, 504d
Abstract
According to a widely held view, the disappearance of the elenchus
in the middle and late dialogues would indicate an important shift
in Plato’s thought. This shift would be so radical that the Socrates
found in the Socratic dialogues would not be the same as the Socrates
of the Republic. Whereas the first would be a faithful representation
of the real –historical– Socrates, the second would be a false,
«platonised» Socrates. I challenge this view by shedding light on
the continuity between the Socratic dialogues and the Republic
concerning the issue of the examination of the soul. Paying attention
to this continuity enables us to perceive the unity of Plato’s project
(which is motivated by a concern for politics) and to reject the idea
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of the two Socrates or worse, of a «schizophrenic Socrates,» as
Vlastos once put it. My analysis rests on a political interpretation of
Socrates’ famous watchword: «An unexamined life is not worth
living for human beings».
* * *
According to a widely held view, which the works of Gregory Vlastos
served to reinforce, the disappearance of the elenchus from the dialogues
of maturity would signal an important shift in Plato’s thought. This shift
would be so radical that the Socrates found in the so-called Socratic
dialogues would not be the same as the Socrates of the Republic. Whereas
the first would be a faithful representation of the real Socrates, the second
would be a false, «platonised» Socrates. This hermeneutic perspective
merits discussion because of the presuppositions on which it depends.
These presuppositions have considerable implications towards the status
of the true opinion and the question of knowing to whom the Socratic
exhortation to practice philosophy is addressed – to humanity as a whole
or to a small number of people? In this article, I will attempt to shed light
on the continuity that exists between the Socratic dialogues and the
Republic by focusing on the issue of the examination of the soul. In my
view, this continuity, which finds it source in a political concern, calls for
the rejection of the hypothesis of a rupture in Plato’s thought, of the two
Socrates, or worse, of a «schizophrenic Socrates.» 1
«An unexamined life is not liveable for human beings»
I begin by citing a passage from Vlastos concerning the possible break
between an authentic Socrates and a platonised Socrates, described as
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1 «I have been speaking of a ‘Socrates’ in Plato. There are two of them. In different
segments of Plato’s corpus two philosophers bear that name. The individual remains the
same. But in different sets of dialogues he pursues philosophies so different that they could
not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain throughout unless it had been the brain
of a schizophrenic. They are so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply
with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with
Aristotle’s.» Vlastos 1991, 45-46.
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«crypto-oligarchical.» This passage clearly highlights the philosophical,
ethical, and political implications of such a rupture:
How profoundly democratic in the broader sense of the
term these are [namely, «Socrates political sentiments and
loyalties»] we can see by comparing him on this point with
Plato in the Republic. To confine, as Plato does in Books
IV to VII of that work, moral inquiry to a tiny elite, is to
obliterate the Socratic vision which opens up the philosophic
life to all. If «the unexamined life is not worth living by a
human being» (Ap. 38a), Plato’s restriction of the examined
life to an elite would have been seen as making life not
worth living for the mass of human beings […] Socrates
democratized moral philosophy: he brought it within the
reach of the «many».2
The principal components of Vlastos’ reasoning could be summarized
as follows:
1) The Socratic dialogues present an accurate portrait
of Socrates.
2) In these dialogues –especially the Apology, which
is a dialogue that Plato wrote early in his career–
Socrates emphasizes the value of moral inquiry
for all.
3) Thus, the historical Socrates, who was demophilic,
opened the access to moral inquiry and philosophical
life to all.
Furthermore,
4) In the Republic, Socrates restricts philosophical
examination to the intellectual elite. (Remind dialectics
«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH...
2 Vlastos 1991, 18.
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is the last stage of the philosopher’s education; this
kind of examination is not opened to all.)
5) Since the real Socrates was himself a demophile
who encouraged everyone to philosophize, it
becomes apparent that the philosophically elitist Plato
lurks behind the Socrates of the Republic.
The conclusion seems evident. However, it rests on a false implicit
premise. This premise is that, examination (here exetasis) on the one
hand, and moral inquiry and philosophical life on the other, would be,
without qualification, perfect synonyms. But what exactly are we to make
of Socrates’ assertion, in the Apology, that an unexamined life is not
worth living, or even liveable?3 Does he mean that each person should
devote their life to the philosophical investigation of the nature of the
virtues and the Good? That people cannot live well, or even live at all,
without an active and personal engagement in such «moral inquiry»? And
furthermore, is dialectics, as described in the central Books of the
Republic, really what comes to replace Socratic examination?
Context of the statement
Vlastos bases himself on the famous statement in the Apology, 
 (38a5-6), to argue that
Socrates «opens up the philosophic life to all». It is worth looking into the
meaning of that short sentence, probably the most famous of Plato’s
corpus. In the Apology, Socrates states that he spends his life
philosophizing; by this, he refers to the task of submitting to examination,
exetazein, that the god (indirectly) gave him.4 From a methodological
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3  is traditionally translated as «worth living». However, adjectives ending with
-tos simply express possibility. Saying that life is «not liveable» is much stronger than to
say that it is «not worth living», but I suspect that this is what Plato’s Socrates had in mind.
4 In the sentence «You shall no longer engage in this search nor philosophize» (Ap.
29c), «nor» is «epexegetic» according to Vlastos, since «for Socrates, to philosophize is to
examine», Vlastos 1994, 4. Brisson’s translation of 28e expresses the same idea: «[...] vivre
en philosophant, c’est-à-dire en soumettant moi-même et les autres à l’examen.»
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standpoint, the examination consists in a questioning in search of definitions
based on refutation; but what is its aim? The verb exetazein is not very
frequent in the Platonic corpus. It is interesting to note that the terms
relating to exetasis have a military meaning, as they indicate the inspecting
of troops, the passing in review of soldiers to ensure that each one of
them is rightly equipped and in his exact place.5 Also, in 28e-29a, Socrates
appeals to the same picture, when he compares his mission to a kind of
military duty and evokes the «post» (taxis) where the god has placed
him.6 Taking this military meaning seriously should lead us to believe that
the examination, whose importance for all is highlighted by Socrates,
does not have as its objective a kind of philosophical questioning on the
morals that everyone should engage in (a type of Kantian invitation
–before its time– to use one’s own understanding). It would rather be a
kind of verification, of inspection to which a person must agree to be
submitted; a sort of inspection in which individuals may face
admonishment for their behaviour, their orientation, and their value, or
for the role they are expected to have in the whole of which they are a
part.7 Further, this submission to examination, as Plato presents it in the
«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH...
5 After the general meaning («examine well or closely scrutinize, review»), it is the
second meaning listed in the LSJ: «of troops, inspect, pass in review». For the literal
meaning, see Xenophon, Anabasis 5, 3, 3; Thucydides 4, 74, 3; 6, 42, 1; 6, 45, 1; 6, 96, 3;
6, 97, 3; 7, 33, 6 etc.; for the figurative sense, see Demosthenes, On the Crown, 320.
6 Socrates claims that his exetasis mission was not freely chosen. Rather, it was linked
to a taxis that was ascribed to him: «This is the truth of the matter, men of Athens: wherever
a man has taken a position () that he believes to be the best, or has
been placed by his commander, there he must, I think, remain and face danger, without a
thought for death or anything else, rather than disgrace. It would have been a dreadful way
to behave, men of Athens, if, at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I had at the risk of death,
like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered
me (), and then, when the god ordered me (
), as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself
and others ( ),
I had abandoned my post () for fear of death or anything else.» 28d-29a.
7 In the Apology, Socrates makes many references to the fact that he regularly blamed
his fellow citizens of Athens in that regard. Brisson describes Socrates’ mission as «une
pratique de la philosophie entendue comme refutation révélant la valeur d’un être humain.»
Brisson 2001, 94.
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short dialogues, appears as a rebuttal of the pretension to knowledge in
the search for definitions. However, as the statement in 38a shows well,
that testing does not relate, in the end, to the intellectual ability of each
citizen to find the definition of moral concepts, but rather to his life. The
warnings given by Socrates after his condemnation show it clearly: life,
bios, is the object of the examination.
You did this [namely, sentenced Socrates to death] in
the belief that you would avoid giving an account of your
life (    
), but I maintain that quite the opposite
will happen to you. There will be more people to test you
( ), whom I now
held back, but you did not notice it. [...]. You are wrong if
you believe that by killing people you will prevent anyone
from reproaching you for not living in the right way. To
escape such tests is neither possible nor good […].
 Apology, 39c
Therefore, in order to understand what Socrates really means when
he says, , one must
resist the temptation to artificially separate this famous sentence from the
dramatic context of the Apology. Indeed, we must keep in mind that
during his trial, Socrates wants to convince the judges of the tremendous
utility of the very unpleasant tests he imposed on his fellow citizens. So,
when Socrates affirms that «an unexamined life is not liveable», perhaps
we should not interpret it as «Philosophize! Dedicate your life, as I do, to
an inquiry about the nature of the virtues, otherwise, you will not live
well,» but rather as: «Let me examine you! Because life will not be worth
living, it will not be liveable, if you condemn me in order to escape the
unpleasant inspection prescribed by the god.» «You need someone like
me to appraise your life, to make you realize that you don’t live as you
should, that you don’t possess the knowledge you claim to possess, and
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that this has a negative impact on your personal bios, as well as on our
collective bios.»
Indeed, the reason Socrates was accused and faced capital
punishment is not because he invited his fellow citizens to dedicate
themselves to a free investigation into the nature of moral concepts. Rather,
it is because he publicly submitted respected and influential Athenians to
a humiliating test. His «inspection» revealed the inadequacy of their
supposed virtue, of their supposed knowledge, and made clear,
consequently, that they were usurping a «post» (taxis) which they did
not deserve in the «life», the bios, of the polis. This is the kind of ignorance
which, should it not be brought to light and denounced, risks making life,
collective life in particular, not biotos, not liveable.8 The examination to
which everyone must be submitted essentially has, then, for its objective
to reveal the real state of the soul –its ignorance, amathia– and the need
for care, that is to say, the need for education. Now, if this is the aim of
Socrates’ mission of examination, such a test still exists in the Republic.
And this test, contrary to what Vlastos claims, far from being reserved to
the intellectual and political elite, still applies to the whole of citizens. This
is what I now want to demonstrate.
Continuity and transformation of the examination
of souls as testing mode
If this continuity escaped Vlastos’ attention, and if he thought it
necessary to postulate the existence of two Socrates, it could simply be
because he was not looking in the right place. For what takes the place
of the testing and refutation to which Socrates personally submitted his
interlocutors in the early dialogues is not dialectics, as Vlastos implicitly
suggests. Rather, I would argue that it is the testing designed to verify
which souls contain «gold», «silver», or «bronze». It is this testing which
serves to distinguish the type of nature each citizen possesses, in order to
«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH...
8 Collective life risks not being «liveable» in a very literal way if this type of usurpation
leads to tyranny, for example.
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assign them their particular requisite post, their taxis.9 Two principal
reasons surely explain the failure to recognize this basic continuity between
the Socratic examination of the early dialogues and the various methods
of testing mentioned in the Republic, the Politics, and the Laws. First,
there is the fact that interpreters typically concentrate their attention on
questions of method rather than on intended purpose or aim (in this case,
the elenchus that occurs in the context of a definitional inquiry).10 And
second, there is the fact that, following Vlastos, research became
increasingly focused on the term elenchos. However, elenchos is but
one of the numerous expressions used to designate the testing to which
Socrates submits his interlocutors. In order to provide a significant picture
of the continuities and ruptures between the early dialogues and the great
political works concerning this issue, we must first rid ourselves of this
blinding fixation on the term  to examine terms like 
  and .11
This being said, the differences between the modes of examination of
the soul in the Socratic dialogues and the Republic seem, at first glance,
so profound that it may be excessive to see a significant continuity between
them. First obvious change: while Socrates submitted a particular soul to
an examination taking the form of a discursive exchange in the Socratic
dialogues, in the Republic the philosopher-kings surreptitiously submit
the soul of the citizens as a collective to a series of tests, such that those
whose natures are under examination are unaware of being subjected to
such scrutiny. The leaders are to observe the behaviour of children while
ANNIE LARIVÉE
9 See Rep. IV, 415b-c for example.
10 See Smith 1998, 152.
11 R. Robinson, who wrote before Vlastos’ work focused the attention of interpreters
on the term elenchos, could still appreciate that terminological diversity. See Robinson
[1941] 1984, 7: «[…] such is the Socratic elenchus,» he writes, «often referred to also as
exetasis or scrutiny and basanismus or assay.» In fact, the word basanismos, which means
«torture» according to the LSJ, does not appear in Plato’s dialogues. We do find, however,
many occurrences of the term basanos (16 occurrences) and basanizein (30 occurrences) in
the platonic corpus.
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they play,12 and that of the youth in the context of their physical or intellectual
training.13 And, in particular, leaders are to place guardian apprentices into
certain destabilizing situations to observe their reactions. Each step of the
guardians’ education is described as a form of testing.14 The citizens of
Socrates’ imagined city are thus constantly submitted to an examination
aiming to reveal the true nature of their souls, and to determinate the role
which they shall be called upon to assume in the polis.
The second change is even more radical. In fact, in the earlier dialogues,
the testing by Socrates essentially aimed to purge souls of their false
opinions – and particularly from the belief that one knows when one
does not (amathia). In contrast, in the Republic, the test aims to select
«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH...
12Rep. 537a-b. In the Statesman, the art of statesmanship will weave the polis’s fabric
using only citizens who possess a good nature and will identify them by observing children’s
behaviour in play: «it will first put them to the test in play ,
and after the test () it will in turn hand them over to those with the
capacity to educate them and serve it towards this particular end.» (308d4). See also Laws
735a4, 736c2.
13 The way young people react to studies constitutes, as such, a test that reveals which
citizens are meant to become guardians, Rep. 503e1. See also Letter VII, 340d-341a: «Those
who are really not philosophers but have only a coating of opinions, like men whose bodies
are tanned by the sun, when they see how much learning is required, and how great the
labor, and how orderly their daily lives must be to suit the subject they are pursuing,
conclude that the task is too difficult for their powers; and rightly so, for they are not
equipped for this pursuit. But some of them persuade themselves that they have already
sufficiently heard the whole of it and need make no further effort. Now this is a clear and
infallible test to apply to those who love ease and are incapable of strenuous labour [...].»
14 Socrates explains that once they reach the age of thirty, the best ones will be selected:
«[…] then, you’ll have to look out for the ones who most of all have this ability in them and
who also remain steadfast in their studies, in war, and in the other activities laid down by
law. And after they have reached their thirtieth year, you’ll select them in turn from among
those chosen earlier and assign them yet greater honours. Then you’ll have to test them by
means of the power of dialectic (), to discover
which of them can relinquish his eyes and other senses, going on with the help of truth to
that which by itself is. And this is a task that requires great care.» Rep. 537d. Once the
guardians in training go down into the cave again and occupy offices, Socrates explains that
«in these too, they must be tested () to see whether
they’ll remain steadfast when they’re pulled this way and that or shift their ground.» Rep.
540a1.
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the souls which have the best ability to maintain certain beliefs. The
goal of the examination is no longer to detach the soul from some of its
opinions; it rather aims to test the soul’s ability to stay firmly attached to
the true belief transmitted to it. Concerning the future guardians, Socrates
explains that
we must choose from among our guardians those men who,
upon examination, seem most of all to believe throughout
their lives that they must eagerly pursue what is
advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the
opposite. […] we must observe them at all ages to see
whether they are guardians of this conviction and make
sure that neither compulsion nor magic spells will get them
to discard or forget their belief that they must do what is
best for the city.
 Rep. 412d-e
Modes of testing will be developed for each of the three possible
alternatives to lose a true belief, namely: 1) By «theft», that is to say,
through forgetting or through dissuasion by argument; 2) by «violence»
or «compulsion», when one abandons the true belief because of suffering;
3) by «magic spells», when one is seduced by pleasure or when one is
shaken by fear. The souls will thus be examined (here, the verbs used are
and) by being placed in certain critical situations
corresponding to these three possibilities of losing a true belief through
the pressure of circumstances.15
At first sight, the differences seem enormous between the examination
to which Socrates submits his interlocutors in the early dialogues, and the
modes of testing presented in the Republic (as well as in the Politics and
the Laws). Thus, can we really speak of continuity between these two
testing practices?
ANNIE LARIVÉE
15 These are beliefs that will make the citizens care first and foremost for the well-being
of the polis.
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From a corrective horizon to a preventive horizon
First, despite the difference in method, in both groups of texts the
task remains the same –to uncover the soul, to reveal its nature, its state.
But more importantly, these divergent methods and approaches can be
explained by a difference in the political context.16 Indeed, in the early
dialogues, Socrates is faced with individuals whose souls have been
corrupted by a hastily constituted society– a sick politeia in the terms of
the Republic, a sick collective way of life or bios. In view of these
conditions, his task is essentially corrective. It consists in an attempt to
repair –if at all possible– the damage caused by a deficient education and
defective political institutions. To do this, he must inculcate his fellow
citizens with an awareness of the necessity of taking care of their souls,
and of having recourse to the competence of the expert who is apt to
proffer such care, the .17 But in
the great political works, the point of view is radically different: Socrates
takes the liberty of imagining how one could prevent the emergence of
evil. His task is no longer to provide corrective individual care. Rather, it
is to imagine what political conditions could render life liveable from
psychological and civic points of view. The move away from the elenchus
would thus not signify that Socrates –or Plato– abandoned the idea of a
direct participation by all in philosophical life (that he ever subscribed to
such an idea is doubtful). Rather, it reflects the fact that, from the
perspective of imagining a form of preventive political care, the negative
therapeutic process of purging false beliefs becomes less pertinent. Indeed,
in a preventive context, it is the transmission of true beliefs assuring the
«health» of the soul which takes precedence over everything else. Such a
difference in orientation can moreover clearly be discerned in the choice
«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH...
16 See Larivée 2003, 98-102.
17 Laches 185e4-6. On the political scope of the elenchos, see Balaudé 1996, 36.
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of vocabulary. Since terms related to basanos are predominant, we see
that the refutation of falsity gives way to a form of positive affirmation of
value.18
Furthermore, although I will not demonstrate it here, the value
attributed to true belief in the Republic does not denote a fundamental
change in Plato’s philosophical orientation. In the Meno, we find the
statement that true belief has the same worth as knowledge about how to
conduct one’s life. Recall that according to Vlastos, it is with this text that
Socrates’ fundamental conviction –that an unexamined life is not worth
living– would completely collapse:
When this conclusion is reached [namely that «for governing
action aright true belief is as good as knowledge»] a whole
row of Socratic dominos will have to fall, including the
fundamental conviction that «The unexamined life is not
worth living by a man». For if true opinion without
knowledge does suffice to guide action aright, then the great
mass of men and women may be spared the pain and
hazards of the «examined» life: they may be brought under
the protective custody of a ruling elite who will feed them
true beliefs to guide their conduct aright, without allowing
them to inquire why those beliefs are true. Access to the
critical examination of questions of good and evil, right and
wrong, may then be reasonably withheld from all but the
elite, and even from them until they have finished the
mathematical studies which will prepare them for
enlightenment. So in the Meno we see Plato well started
ANNIE LARIVÉE
18 While, in most cases, «to refute» (elenchein, exelenchein) involves an attempt to
reveal the falsity of someone’s claim (especially in the judicial context), basanizein, basanon
lambanein, rather means that one attempts to attest the value of a claim. Originally, the
basanos is the touchstone that confirms that a metal is, indeed, gold (and not merely a
fraudulent alloy). In the context of a trial, the basanos to which a slave is submitted aims at
attesting the veracity of his master’s claims. The citizen who was accused was invited to
give his slaves over to his accuser so that they could be submitted to torture in order to
prove the veracity of his own declarations. See Dorion 1990, 320 sq and 324 sq.
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on a course that will take him to the other extreme from
convictions he had shared with Socrates in the Elenctic
Dialogues: the doctrine of the philosopher-king looms
ahead.19
The falseness of this reasoning becomes apparent once the purpose
of the examination advocated by Socrates in the Apology is understood.
But, in addition, one must draw attention to the constant insistence, in the
early dialogues, on the necessity of having recourse to certain experts on
the care of the soul, as one would have recourse to the advice of a doctor
or a physical trainer. This insistence rests on the implicit valorisation of
true belief, for the individual who requires and follows the expert’s advice
does not himself possess knowledge.20 Furthermore, the idea that
knowledge should not be accessible to all in every occasion and in any
conditions is already being held by Socrates in the prologue of the
Protagoras. There, he explains to the young Hippocrates that the
nourishment of the soul should be «ingested» only while abiding by the
advice of an expert on the matter. In short, the epistemological elitism of
the Republic is already well at work in the so-called Socratic dialogues.
We thus must resist the anachronistic temptation to construe the Socratic
plea for care of the soul as an invitation to self-therapy.21
Surely, from a historical point of view, it is not implausible that by
moving from a corrective therapeutic perspective based on individual
testing to a preventative approach of a collective and political nature, it
was Plato’s aim to implicitly critique the method of his master. That the
corrective method based on refutation and admonition proved to be fairly
«AN UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH...
19 Vlastos 1991, 125.
20 Socrates makes a paradigmatic use of the figures of the physician and of the master
gymnast in the Crito (47a-b), the Protagoras (313d-314a), the Laches (184e-185e), and the
First Alcibiades (128c).
21 I defended that thesis in my PhD dissertation, L’Asclépios politique. Étude sur le
soin de l’âme dans les dialogues de Platon.
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ineffective is witnessed implicitly by the destinies of certain of Socrates’
disciples represented in the early dialogues, such as Alcibiades or
Charmides. It was known to Plato’s contemporaries that these disciples
had, in the end, turned out to be failures.22 However, from a strictly
dramatic point of view, the coexistence of these two styles of testing
–corrective and preventive– in no way threatens the coherence of
Socrates’ persona. He can challenge the reigning corruption by way of
the elenchos in certain dialogues, while believing in the pertinence of a
collective, educational, and political solution in others. Plato’s dialogues
thus only present a single Socrates. And even if he occasionally hears
voices, nothing indicates that he is schizophrenic.
Carleton University, Canada
22 In his Book, Scott devotes a lot of attention to Socrates’ failure. See Scott 2000.
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